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Green With Envy? Greenmail is Good! Rational Economic
Responses to Greenmail in a Competitive Market for
Capital and Managers
Eric Engle*
ABSTRACT
"Greenmail" denotes the decision by a corporation's board of direc-
tors to repurchase its shares that are held by a corporate raider,
often at a significant premium, thereby keeping the board of direc-
tors in office. It may represent a conflict of interest between the
corporation's shareholders and the board of directors. While green-
mail is legal, 50% of greenmail gains are subject to taxation. This
Article argues that greenmail has a healthy role in a competitive
market economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporate raider purchases a significant number of shares of a
stock on the public market, driving the price of the stock upward. The
raider then offers the company the chance to buy back his shares at an
even higher price - or face the prospect of a hostile takeover, sale of
assets, and new management. Management buys back the raider's
shares at a higher value than on the public market. The raider sells
their shares. The price of the stock on the open then market falls. Is
there anything wrong in this scenario? Before you answer - what if
management did not buy back the raider's shares? Suppose that the
raider then tried to take over the company driving the public price of
the shares even higher. Is there still something wrong? What if the
raider fails to take over the company? What if the raider succeeds?
When we see all the different basic scenarios, the impossibility of a
quick clear answer becomes apparent: here, one more variable, what if
the company is poorly managed?
This practice of forcing a choice between a premium share repur-
chase and the threat of a takeover is called "greenmail," a term used
to contrast the subtsance of the transaction from "blackmail," or ille-
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gal extortion. What exactly is greenmail? Is it wrong? Is it legal? What
are its effects on the market? What responses are there to greenmail?
This Article takes the position that greenmail essentially represents
a healthy aspect of competition to keep entrenched corporate man-
agement honest. Rather than introducing economic distortions, green-
mail serves as an important market signal of an unhealthy company.
Greenmail should not be prohibited and greenmail income should be
taxed at the standard tax rate for ordinary gains.
A. History of Corporate Take-Overs
Greenmail arose as a natural evolution of corporate takeovers.
Prior to the 1960's, raiders sought to take over companies by proxy
fights.1 A proxy fight occurs when a raider tries to convince sharehold-
ers to vote in favor of the takeover.2 Proxy fights are subject to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 The 1934 Act requires disclosure of
the "identity and background of the purchaser, the source of funds to
be used for the purchase, the purchaser's plans to liquidate, merge, or
make other major changes to the target company, and the number of
shares owned and sought" to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") and to the issuer of securities. 4 Trading target shares for
raider securities is another route to accomplishing the same end, with
this transaction being controlled by the Securities Act of 1933. 5
Tender offerings by raiders of cash for targeted stock became popular
in the 1960's and are covered by the Williams Act,6 which requires
disclosure of tender offer information to the SEC and to the target
company. In the 1980's, raiders realized that they could obtain cash
payouts from management without even taking control of the target
company. "Greenmail" describes this practice of inflating a stock's
price by purchasing it on the open market and initiating a takeover
bid while giving management the option to repurchase its shares from
the raider above the already inflated price. This leads to an important
question: Is greenmail just an elaborate form of pump and dump?
The quick answer is "no." To answer that question fully we need an
exact definition of greenmail.
1. Mark E. Crain, Disgorgement of Greenmail Profits: Examining a New Weapon in State
Anti-Takeover Arsenals, 28 HOUSTON L. REV. 867, 871-72 (1991).
2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards
Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1074, 1078 (1990).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(e) (2006).
4. Crain, supra note 1, at 872.
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77kk (2006).
6. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n (d)-(f) (2006)).
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B. Definition of Greenmail
Greenmail occurs when a shareholder acquires a significant amount
of a company's stock and then threatens to take over the company
unless the purchaser's shares are bought back by the company at a
premium.7 Greenmail payments represent a repurchase premium. 8
Not all premium rate stock repurchases are considered suspect. For
example, the decision to repurchase the shares of a company's
founder or those shares held by a "white knight" are not consdiered
inherently suspect. 9 Should premium repurchases be prohibited gener-
ally? Founders already have stock options and, possibly, watered
stock. Why should premium repurchases be allowed to "white
knights," traders who are friendly to management, and not for raid-
ers? The interests of the shareholders, not those of management,
should control and, thus, if premium share repurchases are allowed as
to founders or white knights, then they should also be allowed as to
ordinary shareholders. To determine whether premium share repur-
chases should be allowed, we must consider the economic effects and
theoretical justifications/critiques of greenmail.
C. Theories of Greenmail
One theory, the "management entrenchment" hypothesis, holds
that management pays out greenmail to keep their own jobs.10 This is
likely the case as management has an obvious self-interest in main-
taining corporate control. Though management does have an interest
in keeping their jobs, this does not necessarily cause a conflict of inter-
est between management and ordinary shareholders. Therefore,
greenmail ought not to be prohibited on the basis of a possible conflict
of interest between shareholders and management. Shareholders have
internal governance mechanisms, as well as the option of not buying
into or selling out of companies with entrenched managers.
7. William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEo. L.J. 845, 850 n. 16 (2005).
8. David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN.
217, 225 (2001).
9. "When a significant block of shares is repurchased from a particular (targeted) shareholder
not as part of an announced repurchase program for general corporate purposes, the repurchase
may occur at a substantial premium over the then-current market price. The premium thus rep-
resents beneficial terms not available to shareholders generally. Some premium targeted repur-
chases, such as those from heirs of firm founders, or from white knights who hold shares to
protect a valued corporate partner from outside takeover interest, arouse little attention from
nonparticipating shareholders." Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
10. Note, Greenmail: Target Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothe-
sis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1985).
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Another theory is that management makes greenmail payments to
defend the "shareholder's interests."'" According to this second view,
management has inside information that is not reflected in the stock's
price. Greenmail under this second view is paid to protect the ordi-
nary shareholders' interests. Another view is that greenmail is paid to
reduce the costs of litigation or opposition to management strate-
gies.12 Some economists argue that greenmail is justifiable as it distrib-
utes costs of policing management. 13
The obvious self-interest of management to keep their jobs makes
the management entrenchment hypothesis plausible. However,
though greenmail payouts reflect management's self-interest, they
also represent an ordinary function of competition in the marketplace
for good managerial teams. Greenmail payouts are a penalty for mis-
management and a market signal. They are a healthy part of the crea-
tive destruction which is the very nature of capitalist competition.
D. Economic Effects of Greenmail
What are the economic effects of greenmail? Empirical studies of
greenmail on stock price and of managerial motivation in paying
greenmail have been mixed.14 Greenmail payments usually' 5 lead to a
decline in the publicly-traded price of the stock. This is because man-
agement's opposition to takeovers is seen as a sign of expected poor
future performance.' 6 Some think that shows that greenmail is gener-
ally not in the shareholders' interests.17 I disagree. Even if greenmail
were not an important market signal and a healthy competitive incen-
tive for the capital market, greenmail does not generally affect pru-
dent investors in a targeted company. Shareholders are heterogenous
11. Christopher J. Bellini, The Evolution of Greenmail: A Lawyer's Dilemma in Corporate
Representation, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 533, 535-36 (1988).
12. "According to the 'management entrenchment' hypothesis, the management of a firm re-
sorts to greenmail as a takeover defense principally to save their own jobs. Alternatively, the
'shareholders' interests' hypothesis defends greenmail; the management of a firm presumably
possesses private information concerning underlying values which the new investors have uncov-
ered through costly investigation. Greenmail may then represent the rejection by management
of an inadequate offer. Another view is that management may be ridding the firm of disruptive
shareholders, ending costly litigation, or reducing dissident opposition to management strate-
gies." Manry & Stangeland, supra note 8, at 220.
13. Note, supra note 10, at 1055.
14. Bellini, supra note 11, at 540.
15. For a history of empirical studies on greenmails effect on stock prices, see Manry &
Stangeland, supra note 8, at 222.
16. Id. at 224.
17. "When news of a greenmail payment is announced, however, the stock price typically falls.
The price declines are generally interpreted as evidence that these repurchases are inconsistent
with shareholders' interests." Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
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- each is in a different position. When the raider starts buying stock
in the target company, the stock's price will generally rise. Some
shareholders will sell and cash in on a windfall profit. Still others will
hold out and then gladly buy the suddenly undervalued stock after the
greenmail has been paid. In other words, just as the economic studies
yield mixed results, so too are the effects of greenmail on individual
shareholders unpredictable. Even if takeover rumors always lead to
inflation of a stock price, and even if greenmail payments always lead
to a reduction of the stock's publicly-traded price, the market, includ-
ing prudent investors, can take all of that into account. Greenmail is
just one more example of self regulation of the market through com-
petition. Further, if greenmail weeds out bad management, which it
likely does, then it is good for the economy.
Greenmail weeds out bad management. "[F]irms paying greenmail
have above-average management turnover in the following year."' 8
Moreover, greenmail is not effective as a tactic to prevent a hostile
takeover. For example, the St. Regis Co. paid greenmail twice; the
third takeover bid resulted in the sale to a white knight. 19 Though
greenmail is not an effective tool for entrenching management, and is
unproblematic for that reason too, greenmail is an effective way to
threaten entrenched and inefficient managers. Greenmail isn't a prob-
lem. It's a solution.
In other words, greenmail is more than just an elaborate "pump-
and-dump" scheme. True, the takeover bid generally increases the
price of the stock on the open market. Likewise, the greenmail payout
generally results in "falling stock prices." So what? That's completely
normal - it's called the law of supply and demand. Even if that
weren't the case, regulators must remember: managment can always
"just say no" and refuse to pay greenmail. Raiders take on a signifi-
cant risk in hopes of a correspondingly significant reward; they aren't
always right. The good business with bad management may turn out to
be a bad business with good management capable of ferocious resis-
tance for little or no reward. Second, management, especially en-
trenched and inefficient management, deserves to be threatened with
a takeover when it is ineffective. Greenmail is just one more instance
of capitalist competition leading to best performance.
18. Id. at 223.
19. Bellini, supra note 11, at 539.
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II. RESPONSES TO GREENMAIL
To the extent that greenmail represents ordinary competition it
does not need a remedy. Responses to greenmail are essentially an-
ticompetitive. Because greenmail has a healthy function in the market,
it is unsurprising that greenmail is not considered to be the crime of
extortion, or any crime at all.20 Greenmail is not extortion because
there is no unlawful obtention of property21 and because management
does not have the right to be free from the threat of a hostile take-
over. 22 Courts recognize the competitive function of corporate
raiding.
A. Corporate Responses
1. Greenmail Payments are Lawful and Subject to the
Business Judgment Rule
The decision of management to pay out greenmail is permitted as
an instance of business judgement. The "business judgement rule" es-
sentially holds that courts will not second guess the lawful decisions of
management by allowing for various causes of actions, such as the tort
of "negligent management." 23 However the business judgement rule is
modified in the law of Delaware, New York, and California to take
into account the conflict of interest between managers and sharehold-
ers.24 Each of those states require management to prove there is some
rationale justifying its decision.25 California requires the inherent fair-
ness of the transaction to be shown.26 New York requires the justifica-
tion be not merely arguable, but also plausible.27 Delaware requires
that the transaction be arguably in the shareholders' interest.28 Dela-
ware permits greenmail payments provided the purpose of manage-
ment is not self-entrenchment; 29 however, in doing so, it requires an
enhanced business judgement inquiry. Some "factors that the board of
directors should analyze include: the inadequacy of the price offered,
the nature and timing of the offer, questions on illegality, the impact
20. Stuart P. Green, Theft by Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining, 44 WASH-
BURN L.J. 553, 577 (2005).
21. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Icahn, 747 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
22. Id. at 213-14; Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
See also Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
23. Bellini, supra note 11, at 546.
24. Id. at 552.
25. Id. at 552-53.
26. Id. at 553.
27. Id.
28. Bellini, supra note 11, at 553.
29. Id. at 546.
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on constituencies other than shareholders, the risk of nonconsumma-
tion, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange." 30
2. Charter/By-Law Amendment
Within the logic of capitalist competition and freedom of contract it
is clear that the principal response to greenmail should be made by
the company and not the state. Shareholders can and do amend cor-
porate charters to prohibit greenmail. Amendments to corporate char-
ters, unlike greenmail payments, do not result in a decline in stock
prices.31 International Minerals & Chemicals, Perkin-Elmer, Mobil
Oil, and many other companies have written anti-greenmail provisions
into their charters or bylaws. 32 Thus, there is little reason for state
intervention to prevent greenmail. 33 Government regulation of corpo-
ration charters reduces shareholders' investment choices.34
B. State Responses
1. Disgorgement
Another response to greenmail is disgorgement statutes which re-
quire remittance of greenmail payments. Critics point out that dis-
gorgement reduces competition, diminishes shareholder participation,
and depresses stock values.35 I would argue they also represent a re-
straint on trade and a form of protectionism subject to antitrust law.
2. Anti-Takeover Laws
Some states have introduced anti-takeover statutes. State anti-take-
over statutes have been challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of
both the supremacy clause, alleging inconsistency with the Williams
Act,36 and the dormant commerce clause37 with mixed results.38 The
30. Id. at 547.
31. David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN.
217, 223 (2001).
32. Christopher J. Bellini, The Evolution of Greenmail: A Lawyer's Dilemma in Corporate
Representation, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 533, 537-38 (1988).
33. Subcommittee on Annual Review, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 40
Bus. LAW. 997, 1020 n. 70. (1985).
34. Bellini, supra note 32, at 539.
35. Mark E. Crain, Disgorgement of Greenmail Profits: Examining a New Weapon in State
Anti-Takeover Arsenals, 28 HOUSTON L. REV. 867, 869 (1991).
36. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2006), requires disclosure of stock
purchases greater than 5% of a given class of stock. A state statute in conflict with the Williams
act would be invalid due to the supremacy of federal law.
37. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987).
20071
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Williams Act 39 requires disclosure to the SEC and the target company
when a shareholder acquires more than 5% of a company. A state
anti-takeover statute cannot conflict with the Williams act.40 That is,
the state anti-takeover statute must be consistent with federal law.
State anti-takeover laws have also been made for reasons of protec-
tionism,41 which raises the question of their compliance with the
WTO. Competition among states may be the best way to determine
the best regulatory response to greenmail and hostile takeovers.
C. Federal Responses
1. Taxation
In 1987, Public Law Number 100-203, Sec. 10228(c) established In-
ternal Revenue Code Chapter 54, Section 5881, entitled "Green-
mail". 42 Title 26 of the United States Code, Section 5881 (I.R.C.
§ 5881) imposes a 50% tax on greenmail payments. 43 Greenmail pay-
ments can be in any form, or "consideration. '44 Greenmailed shares
must have been held for less than two years.45 The sale of stock must
be in connection with a public tender offer.46 As well, the greenmail
payment must be differential, that is it must be made on terms other
than are available to all other shareholders.4 7 Public tender offers are
those offers to purchase stock or assets which would be required to be
filed or registered with federal or state regulatory agencies.4 The tax
applies whether or not gain is recognized.4 9
The SEC permits greenmail payments because greenmail payments
are taxed at a higher rate than other income. Coupled with the possi-
bility to amend the corporate charter, the SEC sees no reason for fed-
eral intervention. 50
38. Compare id. at 87-94 (holding an anti-takeover statute was valid) with Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631-40 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding an anti-takeover statute was
invalid).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2006).
40. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 631-32.
41. Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
42. David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN.
217, 227-28 (2001). Section 5881 was further modified in 1988. Id.
43. I.R.C. § 5881(a) (2006).
44. Id. § 5881(b).
45. Id. § 5881(b)(1).
46. Id. § 5881(b)(2).
47. Id. § 5881(b)(2)(C).
48. I.R.C. § 5881 (c)(1) (2006).
49. Id. § 5881 (d).
50. Bellini, supra note 32, at 555.
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2. RICO/Hobbs Act (Extortion)
Critics of greenmail sometimes propose that it should be covered by
the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) or by the Hobbs Act. To obtain a civil RICO remedy under
Section 1962 of the United States Code, plaintiffs must prove: "(1) a
person (2) through a pattern (3) of racketeering activity (4) directly or
indirectly (a) invested in, (b) acquired or maintained an interest in, (c)
or participated in (5) an enterprise (6) that affects or engages in inter-
state commerce and (7) causes injury thereby. '51 Proving wrongful in-
jury, of course, is not really possible. Stock prices are always
speculative. Management and ordinary shareholders have a conflict of
interest. Likewise the Hobbs Act does not seem applicable. The
Hobbs Act 52 has two elements: obstruction of interstate commerce
and robbery or extortion. 53 However, greenmail is not extortion; thus,
the Hobbs Act cannot apply. Again, even if there was a problem, this
really isn't an appropriate remedy.
III. CONCLUSION
Corporate takeovers ensure competition among managers to be ef-
ficient and effective businessmen. Greenmail is one incentive for man-
agerial competition. Thus, greenmail is not itself problematic; it is just
one more mechanism of efficiency through competition. Greenmail is
not an effective tool for managerial self-entrenchment. However, the
speculative impact of greenmail is good for the economy since it high-
lights companies which are poorly managed and overvalued on the
public market. By threatening bad managers of good companies, and
by reallocating capital to efficient actors, greenmail strengthens the
economy. Thus, most of the responses to greenmail are attempts to
remedy a non-problem.
The most effective remedies, consistent with the capitalist logic of
competition and individualism, are at the corporate level. A prudent
corporation can foresee the possibility of a hostile takeover and
amend its articles of incorporation and bylaws to protect itself. Im-
provident corporate managers probably deserve the risk of takeover
that they incur by using shoddy "off the shelf" charters and bylaws.
"Mom and pop" organizations must eventually grow up or sell out to
more efficient operations. Further, the individual remedy is also effec-
51. Tracy Greer, The Hobbs Act and RICO: A Remedy for Greenmail?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 647,
653 (1988).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006).
53. Greer, supra note 51, at 662.
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tive at the shareholder level. Selling stock when there is a takeover
rumor and buying the now (supposedly) undervalued stock in the af-
termath of the payout are rational investor actions that require no
inside information. SEC reporting requirements and shareholder dili-
gence remove the risk of insider trading.
Individual and corporate responses are adequate and best. Merci-
fully, state neo-mercantilist efforts at regulating takeovers are con-
strained by regulatory competition and federal supremacy. Thus many
state anti-takeover statutes have been stricken as illegal.
And the federal response? The federal government imposes a heavy
tax on greenmail, but taxes of 70% were once common. A 50% tax is
onerous enough to discourage speculative greenmail, but not so great
as to prevent raiders from threatening takeovers assuring manage-
ment competition. In the interest of preventing econmic distortion, it
would be wiser to reduce the greenmail tax to the maximum corporate
rate, allow greenmail payments to be characterized as ordinary and
necessary business expenses (that are to be deducted from taxable in-
come), and allow the greenmail payout to be treated as ordinary in-
come, and thus able to be offset by any losses. Such minor tax reforms
will occur to the extent that takeovers become correctly perceived as
one more instrument of economic competition ensuring efficient mar-
kets and good economic performance.
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